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VIETNAM
AGEING STUDY
MANAGEMENT OF EXPLOSIVE 
REMNANTS OF WAR (MORE)
GENEVA INTERNATIONAL CENTRE FOR HUMANITARIAN DEMINING (GICHD)
The Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD) works towards 
reducing risks to communities stemming from explosive ordnance, with particular focus 
on mines, cluster munitions, other explosive remnants of war and ammunition storage.
The Centre helps develop and professionalise the sector for the benefits of its partners: 
national and local authorities, donors, the United Nations, other international and regional 
organisations, non-governmental organisations, commercial companies and academia. It 
does so by combining three distinct lines of service: field support focused on capacity 
development and advice, multilateral work focused on norms and standards, and 
research and development focused on cutting-edge solutions.
Based at the Maison de la paix in Geneva, the GICHD employs around 70 staff members 
from 23 different countries. This makes the GICHD a unique and international centre 
of expertise and knowledge. Our work is made possible by core contributions, project 
funding and in-kind support from more than 30 governments and organisations.
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Every conflict leaves behind explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) in lesser or greater quantities 
depending upon the nature and duration of the 
conflict and the types and quantities of weapons 
used. How ERW are dealt with reflects local 
circumstances and conditions, as well as the 
influence of international humanitarian law (IHL), 
the availability of resources and prioritisation 
choices made by governments, international 
institutions and agencies. In many cases an initial 
period of proactive effort is followed, sooner or 
later, by the adoption of more reactive policies 
and practices. The duration of the transition 
period varies from country to country, but in 
every case a situation eventually arises when 
the ERW that remain are treated as “residual”. 
In many locations where ERW are found, 
the items have been exposed to the outdoor 
environment for many years. The effect of this 
“ageing” on munitions has not been researched 
to any extent, and most information on ageing is 
anecdotal, rather than systematically compiled. 
Additional information and a robust methodology 
are required to enable evidence-based planning 
decisions.
Accurate information on ageing is critical in 
designing a programme that delivers value 
for money and addresses those areas with 
the greatest need as quickly as possible.  The 
protracted nature of clearance activities means 
that the problem is quite complex: victim rates 
change over time, munitions age, populations 
migrate and variable conflict patterns mean that 
not all contaminated areas are known.  In order 
to have a national clearance programme which 
is fit for purpose, these variables need to be 
considered when planning a holistic clearance 
effort. Improvements to global understanding of 
the mechanisms, significance and implications 
of ageing in ERW provide opportunities for other 
mine action programmes to benefit from the 
lessons learned, in establishing studies into the 
ageing of components and compounds of impro-
vised mines and other ERW.
This report presents the results of a pilot study 
conducted in 2018 and provides comment on 
the technical ageing of ERW found in Vietnam, 
to determine the effect of time and surrounding 
environment on the probability of detonation 
and functionality, on a limited number of target 
items. 
The aim of the pilot study was to contribute to 
increased confidence and efficiency in mine 
action prioritisation, planning and risk manage-
ment decision-making within the mine action 
programme in Vietnam, by providing information 
on the effects of and approach to ageing. The 
authors recognise that the sample of munitions 
is not large, so summaries and recommenda-
tions should be taken as cautious and indicative. 
This report provides a narrative on the back-
ground to the approach to ageing of munitions, 
the process of the field work/cutting of the 
munitions, and a description of findings from the 
analysis of the explosive content by Fenix Insight 
Ltd and the Weapons Technical Centre, Military 
Technical Academy, Hanoi, the details of which 
can be found in the annexes to this report.
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APPROACH TO AGEING OF MUNITIONS
The majority of the weapons used during the 
Vietnam conflict originate from the Cold War 
era. Much of the ammunition was manufac-
tured in the 1950s and 60s and has remained 
undisturbed since it was deployed. With the 
exception of some landmines, most of these 
munitions were built with a shelf life of a very 
few years. They were expected to be maintained 
in protective storage and designed to function 
on, or shortly after, deployment yet they have 
now been exposed to the outside environment 
for decades.
This prolonged exposure is well beyond any 
anticipated design consideration and until Fenix 
Insight Ltd began undertaking ageing studies, 
the consequences were largely unknown. In the 
absence of reliable data, the subject has been 
dominated by popular myth and speculation, 
with a widespread assumption that unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) becomes more dangerous as 
it ages. Even experienced explosive ordnance 
disposal (EOD) personnel use emotive terms 
such as “unstable” and “volatile” to express 
their expectation of increased risk, yet there is 
little reliable evidence to support this misconcep-
tion. In fact, recent analysis by Fenix suggests 
that the vast majority of ordnance becomes safer 
within this timescale.
All explosive munitions contain multiple assem-
blies and energetic materials that are critical 
to their function and the majority of these are 
vulnerable to degradation. In most cases, the 
failure of any critical component will lead to the 
item becoming incapable of working as designed. 
To make an analogy, there is no expect ation that 
a 1960s car, camera or typewriter, abandoned in 
the open for decades, would remain operational. 
Similarly, it is inevitable that munitions - manu-
factured from vulnerable materials - will also fail. 
Some have already done so, while many others 
are nearing the end of their functional life.
Whether abandoned or expended, Cold War era ammunition 
throughout the world is suffering from the effects of ageing
Some munitions are barely recognisable, and evidence 
suggests that many are no longer functional
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The inability of a system to function as designed does not necessarily make it safe; in rare instances, it 
may lead to the creation of a new and unintended means of initiation. Examples include the release of a 
mechanism by a weakened component, or a chemical interaction leading to the formation of a sensitive 
compound. In these exceptional cases, the alternative hazard will be temporary, but the degree and 
duration of the new risk may be difficult to establish.
THE RELEVANCE OF AGEING FOR THE MANAGEMENT  
OF RESIDUAL ERW
MORE is all about understanding risk, primarily considering the potential for interaction between people 
and ordnance. The people concerned may be the local communities farming the land, machine operators 
and builders involved in development projects, or specialist operators from clearance agencies. Wherever 
their activities coincide with the location of abandoned or unexploded munitions, the potential for an 
accident to occur is likely to depend heavily on the condition of the item encountered.
Studying the effects of ageing is key to evaluating the hazard posed by munitions and, importantly, 
understanding the future “residual” risk as the ammunition continues to age.
WHAT IS AFFECTED?
Ageing causes changes to every form of explosive ordnance, from small, simple munitions such as land-
mines and grenades to large and complex weapons such as cluster bombs and missiles. Almost every 
type of material is affected, from pyrotechnic compositions and explosive compounds to plastic casings 
and metallic components. In addition to changes within individual components, such as rusting of steel 
or hardening of rubber, materials may react with one another to create unforeseen chemical effects.
A sectioned fuze mechanism from an Mk 82 bomb, blocked 
by the build-up of oxidised aluminium
The hardening of rubber and rusting of steel have changed 
the characteristics of this PMN mine
Critical components transition from full functionality to failure at different rates







Animal activity and accidental human interaction (such as contact with farming implements) may weaken 
or break casings, while external influences (such as the ingress of silt or root structures) also interfere 
with mechanisms.
In weapons where stored electrical energy is needed for initiation, self-deactivation is inevitable. While 
military-grade batteries may last for decades, most commercial cells will degrade within a year or two at 
the most.
The findings are also relevant for improvised explosive devices (IEDs), with strong evidence to suggest 
that the effects of ageing occur much faster in most IEDs than in conventional weapons. Many IEDs use 
flimsy casings, low-grade commercial batteries and water-soluble explosive mixtures, all of which are 
prone to rapid deterioration.
WHERE ARE AGEING MUNITIONS FOUND? 
Unexploded ordnance and ammunition stockpiles throughout the world are undergoing the effects of 
ageing. Although the focus of this study is Vietnam, it draws upon data gathered from studies in many 
other countries. Similarly, many of the findings gained in Vietnam will be relevant to regions and weapons 
elsewhere. A number of local factors, such as climate and soil type, will affect the rate at which critical 
components age, yet the eventual effects are largely the same.
The characteristics of abandoned and unexploded weapons throughout the world are changing. The Vietnam study will contribute 
to our understanding of how they are affected by ageing
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WHO SHOULD BE INTERESTED, AND WHY?
The implications of ageing are important to every group engaged with, or affected by, explosive ordnance. 
Examples of interested parties and the relevance of munition ageing are:




Need to understand the nature of 
the residual risk in order to manage it 
effectively
Is it necessary to clear each and every deep-buried bomb 
in a region, if evidence indicates that they pose a negligible 
threat? 
What level of residual risk will remain in the long term?
Donors Seeking to prioritise tasks and make 
the most effective use of funds
Which types of munition, in which areas, present the 
greatest and most immediate threat, and therefore justify 
the funding of clearance programmes?
Clearance 
agencies
Need to identify munitions and 
understand the risks in order to select 
appropriate clearance techniques 
Are the munitions still recognisable?
Can high-risk munitions, formerly requiring special 
procedures and equipment, be cleared using normal 




Seeking to plug gaps in existing 
detection and disposal capabilities, 
while exploring new opportunities 
created by changing characteristics
The rusting of ferrous components may make metal 
detection more difficult, but will explosive leaking through 




Concern about the potential for 
an accident during excavation and 
construction work
Is a site survey needed before work begins?
Should plant operators be given additional training?
Is an on-site EOD capability needed?
Affected 
communities
Need to be able to recognise munitions.
May have lived with the threat for 
decades, and are already aware of its 
changing nature, but need guidance on 
safe activities
Farmers were forbidden from removing UXO from their 
fields, but had little alternative. Given the low accident rate 
during encounters with degraded ordnance in recent years, 
should the question of “self-help” options be revisited?
Communities must know which locations and activities are 
safe, while their leaders should understand the long-term 
residual risks
The effects of ageing may affect clearance priorities, while 
operators need to be trained and equipped to deal with the 
changing threat
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Analysis will include comparing recovered weapons with 
items in their original condition 
Munitions will be disassembled, or cut remotely, using 
well-established techniques
HOW WILL WE LEARN MORE?
The investigation examined live ammunition from former battlefields, where it has been abandoned or 
failed to explode. Once the ordnance has been recovered, it will be disassembled or cut open remotely, 
so that experts can examine the materials, mechanisms and explosives inside. These will be compared 
to their original condition in order to see how and why they have changed. The ability of the weapon to 
cause harm will be assessed and, where possible, tested under safe conditions.
For the initial “pilot study” a small number of munitions will be selected so that the process can be 
tested. This will include a variety of weapon categories (such as grenades, mines and bombs), so that 
different materials, casing thicknesses, fuze types and explosives are represented. Every step of the 
process will be risk assessed and strictly controlled to minimise the danger, while collecting as much 
data as possible. The team responsible for the work has conducted many such examinations and works 
to international environmental, quality and safety standards (ISO).
The findings from the pilot study will help to prioritise and direct further research, which may be expanded 
to a wider variety of weapon types within Vietnam. The findings will be published in the form of a report, 
along with presentations to key stakeholders and decision makers.
IN SUMMARY
In Vietnam, as in many other countries, abandoned and unexploded ordnance is undergoing major 
changes as a result of the ageing process. These effects are critical to recognition, detection and clear-
ance techniques and, most importantly, to the residual risk they pose. Yet, despite their importance to 
stakeholders at every level, very little is understood about the long-term effects of ageing on ammunition. 
This study will make a substantial contribution to knowledge in this important area and enable better, 




The management of residual explosive remnants 
of war (ERW) programme relies on an accurate 
understanding of the risk posed by ageing 
explosive ordnance. ERW include unexploded 
ordnance (UXO) and abandoned explosive 
ordnance (AXO). However, there has been hardly 
any research into the effects of ageing, and 
therefore very little reliable data is available.
Much of the ordnance used in Vietnam was 
produced in the 1950s, 60s and 70s, with some 
originating from the Second World War. Most 
has remained untouched and vulnerable to the 
local environment, for more than 40 years. 
There is no doubt that the ageing of munitions 
causes a number of significant changes, ranging 
from differences in external appearance, to vari-
ations in functionality. 
The primary aim of the cutting programme is to enable the internal examination of ordnance, in order to 
understand the changes that have occurred, and help gain an accurate assessment of the risk it poses. In 
many instances, this would not be possible by any other means. Non-intrusive methods of examination, 
such as X-ray, do not yield anything approaching the same level of detail as visual inspection.
Although a cutting system has been available in Vietnam for some time, various administrative and 
training issues have prevented its use. A pilot study was therefore needed to revive a host-nation 
capability for ordnance cutting.
AIMS
The work in December 2018 had three major aims:
 • To provide training to host-nation staff in the operation of cutting equipment, in order to allow 
future work to be conducted by local personnel.
 • To cut and assess a small sample of munitions, in order to demonstrate a variety of techniques 
and provide some baseline data for future work.
 • To increase confidence, among the host-nation agencies and other stakeholders, that this type of 
operation could be conducted safely and successfully in Vietnam.
A Vietnamese soldier from BOMICEN sets up a cut on a US 
Mk 82 aircraft bomb
AGEING STUDY14
LIMITATIONS
The initial study was constrained by the following factors:
 • The cutting technique is best suited to larger hard-cased ordnance, such as mortar bombs, 
projectiles and aircraft bombs. Small items such as grenades and submunitions are far more 
difficult to cut into.
 • Despite a wish list comprising a wide range of ordnance, the programme could only use 
ammunition recovered by clearance non-governmental organisations in the preceding weeks. At 
the time of the mission, a fairly limited selection of items was available.
 • The specialists from Golden West Humanitarian Foundation and Fenix were only available 
in-country for a period of one week.
PRELIMINARY ACTIONS
COORDINATION
A large number of stakeholders and contributors had to coordinate in order to allow the project to 
proceed. These included:
 • Geneva International Centre for Humanitarian Demining (GICHD)
 • Province Military Command (PMC)
 • Vietnamese Ministry of Defence
 • Quang Tri military command
 • Vietnam National Mine Action Center (VNMAC)
 • BOMICEN (Technology Centre for Bomb and Mine Disposal)
 • Quang Tri regional authorities
 • Norwegian People’s Aid (NPA)
 • Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF)
 • Fenix Insight Ltd (Fenix)
Arranging facilities, timings and activities between this number of agencies involved a substantial 
coordination effort and added significant complexity to the programme. 
There were also a number of administrative and logistical actions required, including crucial permissions 
that needed to be obtained, before the project could get underway. These had resulted in a previous 
mission, planned for August 2018, being aborted. Each issue was systematically addressed and over-
come by Senior Colonel (Sn Col) Tuan and the major stakeholders, in order to allow the work to proceed.
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EQUIPMENT
The cutting programme involved the use of the 
following key equipment:
 • Mobile cutting system (MCS) consisting 
of a trailer-mounted bandsaw and 
generator
 • Generator (for administrative area)
 • Monitoring camera
 • Lifting frame
 • Chain lifting block and tackle
 • Truck with HIAB crane
All of this equipment had to be moved to the site 
and installed in preparation for the mission.
ADDITIONAL EQUIPMENT
In addition to the host-nation equipment listed 
above, the following items were provided by 
GWHF:
 • Drone (with still/video camera)
 • Additional static video camera
 • Hand tools
 • Reconnaissance kit (including tape 
measure, brushes, marker pens etc., for 
use during exploitation)
PERSONNEL
The personnel on-site included the following:
 • Advisor/coordinator: Sn Col Tuan (retired) 
 • VNMAC (including Mr Thanh and Major 
Penh)
 • BOMICEN (6 EOD personnel)
 • GWHF: Len Austin and his interpreter 
were responsible for providing training on 
cutting methods
 • Fenix Technical Director, Colin King, was 
responsible for exploitation work
 • Province Military Command: 6 personnel, 
including drivers, security and general 
duty personnel, and crane operators
The bandsaw of the mobile cutting system 
A GWHF drone was used for monitoring cuts and provided 
excellent additional imagery 
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FACILITIES
Work was carried out at an NPA site, which had been examined by Sn Col Tuan and approved for purpose 
by all relevant authorities. The site was large enough to safely accommodate all cutting, exploitation and 
disposal activities.
Preparation for the visit was excellent, with separate enclosures built from tents and sandbag walls 
(although these were too low to provide complete protection).
The site incorporated secure storage for smaller ordnance items and had a generator to provide power 
and lighting in each enclosure.
The main site access road had become impassable due to flooding, but an acceptable alternative route 
was found.
ORDNANCE
The munitions consisted of a mixture of UXO 
(recovered from clearance operations) and AXO 
(from storage). 
All items were unitary high explosive (HE) stores 
of US and Russian origin, including mortar 
bombs, artillery projectiles and air-delivered 
bombs. Some of the munitions were fuzed and 
some were not; all of the fuzes present were 
mechanical impact types, with most having been 
heavily damaged on impact.
The mortars and projectiles were stored in 
secure holding areas on-site. Each had been 
labelled. The aircraft bombs were brought from 
remote storage sites, as required.
The site was well prepared by the time GWHF and Fenix arrived





Soon after their arrival, Sn Col Tuan accompanied the GWHF and Fenix teams on an initial visit to the 
work area. Here, they met representatives from BOMICEN and VNMAC and together viewed the site, 
assessed the ordnance and examined the MCS. Some preliminary actions (such as mixing cutting fluid 
and repositioning protective works) were explained and implemented before the start of work the 
following morning.
TUESDAY 4 DECEMBER
The first working day began with a safety briefing from VNMAC and an explanation of the proposed 
activities, with the cutting of smaller calibre live munitions commencing soon after. As each cut was 
completed, sections of the munition were moved across to a separate enclosure for exploitation. Cutting 
and exploitation of mortars and projectiles continued throughout the day, with the involvement of the 
BOMICEN operators being steadily increased.
WEDNESDAY 5 DECEMBER
Quang Tri Province Military Command provided two US Mk 82 (500 lb) bombs, a Russian mortar bomb 
and two Russian artillery projectiles. These items were cut and the explosive fillings of the Mk 82 bombs 
were burned out.
THURSDAY 6 DECEMBER
The morning was devoted to positioning and cutting a US Mk 84 (2,000 lb) bomb; the bomb casing and 
other explosive items (from exploitation) were then burned out. At the end of the mission, an out-brief 
was given by Mr Thanh of VNMAC, with additional comments by all major contributors to reinforce key 
points.
CUTTING TRAINING
Cutting began on the smallest items first (81 mm 
mortar bombs), with technical and procedural 
approaches demonstrated and explained at every 
stage. Work progressed quickly up through larger 
calibre artillery projectiles, eventually moving on 
to the Mk 82 bombs.
Though somewhat limited, the available selection 
of ordnance provided a good introduction to the 
use of the MCS, and the carrying out of cutting 
operations. Throughout the training, responsi-
bility was gradually transferred to BOMICEN and 
PMC engineers, so that they were performing 
most of the actions by the end of the second 
day, including the cutting of an Mk 82 bomb.
The cutting of fuzes, and the Mk 84 bomb, 
provided opportunities for GWHF to demonstrate 
more difficult and specialist operations. 
Soldiers from BOMICEN gradually assumed greater 
responsibility, and conducted the cutting of the second 
Mk 82 bomb virtually unaided
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DISPOSAL TRAINING
Disposal was centred on open burning (OB) 
rather than the open detonation (OD) techniques 
more familiar to BOMICEN. The advantages of 
OB over OD include:
 • Low noise level
 • Absence of air and ground shock
 • Fewer stores required 
 • Fewer storage, accounting and security 
issues
 • Avoidance of metallic contamination
 • Availability of residual scrap metal
The principles of initiation and safe separation 
were explained, together with the use of large 
munition burns to destroy or detonate small 
items (such as fuzes).
Despite the extensive use of OB, it was pointed 
out that there may also be a need for some 
demolition by OD during these programmes. 
EXPLOITATION
Exploitation work was kept completely separate 
from cutting training, with sections taken across 
to a remote enclosure.
As each section arrived, it was allocated a serial 
number and photographed. Visual examination, 
and a limited amount of further disassembly was 
then carried out, with detailed photography of 
relevant observations.
Work was conducted on a single munition 
section at a time and kept to a 1-person risk. 
Time and facilities were limited, allowing only 
for a superficial examination of the ammunition 
sections. Nevertheless, the ability of the process 
to provide accessible samples was clearly 
proven, and there were a number of interesting 
findings. 
The burned-out carcass of the Mk 84 bomb as it cooled. 
Note that the fuze in the nose section (to the right) has been 
deliberately initiated using the heat of the burn, in order to 
render it safe
Cut munitions were taken to a separate tent, well away from 
all other activity, for examination 
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EXPLOSIVE ANALYSIS OF TNT, TETRYL 
AND COMPOSITION H6 SAMPLES
Previous ageing studies and weapons exploitations programmes have determined that the secondary 
explosive found in recovered munitions is usually serviceable. This conclusion is based largely on visible 
characteristics such as appearance and physical integrity, often reinforced by burning small samples, or 
by larger scale open detonation and open burning.  However, until now, there has been little opportunity 
to conduct rigorous scientific testing.
The Vietnamese Institute of Propellants offered this programme a unique opportunity to analyse and 
record the precise physical and chemical properties of explosives extracted from recovered warheads. 
Although there was no expectation of finding the materials to be inoperative, small changes in charac-
teristics, such as melting point and sensitivity, might indicate continuing trends in the degradation of the 
materials. If so, these changes could have significant implications for long-term residual risk.
PHYSICAL CHARACTERISTICS
 • The report concludes that degradation due to ageing has resulted in minor changes in the physical 
characteristics of all 3 explosive types.
 • The result is that some of these characteristics now fall outside the relevant military standards. 
These standards are regularly updated according to the Law on Regulations and Standards 
of Vietnam. Each type of explosive has a standard for determining quality criteria and testing 
methods. The Vietnamese TCVN / QS standards use to evaluate TNT explosive samples in the 
report as the latest version was updated in 2018.
 • Characteristics such as melting temperature and moisture content are set for military utility, 
but small changes are unlikely to have any adverse consequences in UXO or AXO in terms of 
performance as military weapons.
STABILITY
 • The thermal stability and ‘quality’ of all 3 explosive types is still good; they are considered 
appropriate for safe storage and therefore pose no greater risk of accidental detonation from 
overheating than explosives meeting current standards. 
 • However, impact sensitivity for TNT is higher than the military standard. This may increase the 
possibility of accidental initiation under the following circumstances:
 − During violent disturbance, such as pile driving or quarrying;
 − When using low-order (deflagration) EOD techniques.
POWER
 • The lead cylinder compression tests show that all 3 explosive types have retained their original 
explosive energy. This means that:
 − The minor effects of degradation, such as melting temperature and moisture content, have 
made no discernible difference to the destructive potential of the weapons;
 − Tetryl boosters will remain capable of initiating the main fillings (particularly considering 




Exploitation findings are summarised below, with more detailed observations in Annexes A – G.
APPEARANCE
An obvious conclusion is that the appearance of ordnance 
changes as it ages. 
Painted markings are often obscured or lost altogether 
during impact, with even the most superficial corrosion 
worsening the effect. 
With many casings looking similar, the loss of markings 
means reliance on less obvious signatures for identification, 
some of which will be known only to ammunition experts. 
However, as the ageing process continues, even these 
signatures are gradually eliminated. Identification becomes 
even more difficult if the shape has changed significantly, 
through the loss of a key recognition feature, such as a tail 
assembly.
The consequence is that it is has already become difficult to 
identify some types of UXO. This problem will inevitably get 
worse as the ageing process continues to obscure, alter and 
destroy key features. 
The deterioration or detachment of key components may 
also make risk assessment harder. 
For example, on projectiles, the engraving on a driving 
band normally gives a clear indication of whether or not the 
munition has been fired. If this band is absent for any reason 
(copper bands are often removed for their scrap metal value) 
it may be more difficult to establish the projectile’s status 
(fired or unfired), and therefore the risk it poses. 
Similarly, the tail of a mortar bomb may give the only clear 
indication of whether the munition has been fired.
Paint and markings are among the first 
identification features to be lost as the casing 
corrodes 
The loss of key identification features can 
make identification far more difficult 
A projectile with the driving band removed
FURTHER WORK
As the report states these findings do not allow extrapolation, but they do provide some data points that 
can be added to during subsequent research in order to answer the following questions:
 • How will these changes progress in future years?
 • Are they linear?
 • Do they have limits?
 • Can we compare with other known examples?
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CASINGS
Most ordnance is steel-cased and therefore 
vulnerable to corrosion. Since rusting relies on 
the presence of air and water, the immediate 
environment can significantly affect the rate of 
decay. One projectile may be found preserved 
virtually as-new, while another of a similar type 
and age may be heavily corroded.
The expansion and rough surface of rust and 
other metal oxides may lead to the loss of iden-
tification features and can also make it hard to 
determine the precise calibre.
On thick casings, the corrosion is normally super-
ficial, with a substantial layer of unaffected metal 
beneath the surface. However, thinner casings, 
and those subjected to particularly harsh condi-
tions, may deteriorate to the point where they 
can no longer support their contents.
MAIN CHARGES
Most of the ordnance used in Vietnam is based 
on common military high explosives such as TNT 
and RDX (often combined into mixtures such 
as Composition B). These are known to remain 
stable over relatively long periods, particularly 
where they are supported and protected by their 
casing.
Distortion of the munition on impact may crack 
the filling, but this alone is unlikely to significantly 
affect its characteristics. Cracking does, however, 
present a larger surface area to water and other 
contaminants entering the filling. This may lead 
to accelerated deterioration and the leaching of 
potentially toxic compounds into the surrounding 
environment.
A number of explosive samples were sent for 
laboratory analysis, in order to confirm their 
types and establish whether any significant 
changes had taken place.
The corrosion of thick steel casings is normally superficial, 
but may make it hard to measure the calibre 
Explosives such as Composition B remain stable for long 
periods, but may crack on impact
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BOOSTERS
Many of the munitions used in Vietnam use 
high explosive boosters, which are normally 
composed of pressed TNT or Tetryl. Both of 
these explosives are relatively stable and remain 
capable of detonation for many years.
Boosters tend to be well protected by the outer 
casing and are often found intact. However, 
being near the nose or tail of the munition, they 
are often exposed to water. While both have very 
low solubility, they can partially dissolve during 
prolonged exposure. Tetryl is a toxic compound 
and may contaminate the surrounding environ-
ment.
Boosters are often contained in thin aluminium 
casings; these are often found corroded into an 
expanded white oxide, which may penetrate 
nearby fuze structures.
DETONATORS
During the cutting of some munitions, deton-
ators within the fuzes were sliced through. 
GWHF regularly cuts through live detonators, 
which only initiate if there is a technical problem 
with the cut (such as a defective blade, absence 
of cutting fluid or unexpected movement of the 
sample being cut).
The cut detonators revealed primary explosive 
that appeared to be in good condition, but no 
formal testing was conducted to confirm their 
condition. 
Small explosions, heard during burning, 
confirmed that the primary explosive was still 
capable of detonation when sufficient energy 
was available, but not whether the detonators 
would be capable of fulfilling their role as part of 
the explosive train.
A pressed booster from a US artillery projectile, still in 
exceptionally good condition 
Cutting this M524 mortar fuze, demonstrated the ability to 
pass through live detonators without setting them off
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FUZE MECHANISMS
Most mortars and projectiles are fitted with 
nose fuzes, which are usually partially damaged 
or destroyed on impact. Even slight damage 
will allow water to enter, which accelerates the 
degradation process affecting most metals and 
explosive initiators. 
This can lead to several modes of failure in 
mechanical fuzes, including: the inability of the 
mechanism to generate sufficient energy to 
cause initiation (e.g. a rusted spring); the physical 
blockage of movement by damage, the presence 
of foreign matter (such as silt), or the build-up of 
oxidised material from within the fuze; the initi-
ator to be less receptive to input energy (e.g. a 
damp igniter). After prolonged exposure to water, 
a combination of these failure modes tends to 
render fuzes inoperative. 
A brief examination of the fuzes, as shown here, appears to support this finding. However, a good deal of 
further analysis would be needed in order to establish more detailed conclusions on the failure mechan-
isms of individual weapons, and their implications for residual risk.
OTHER COMPONENTS
A variety of other sub-assemblies and compo-
nents were revealed during the cutting process, 
such as:
 • Propellant cartridges
 • Primers
 • Additional energetic material
 • Fuze adaptors
 • Plugs
 • Seals
The ability to visualise the presence, location 
and condition of these components can play an 
important part in assessing the overall risk from 
the munition.
A sectioned M48A1 fuze from an M107 projectile
Cutting allows the visualisation of internal components, such 
as this incendiary pellet
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CONCLUSIONS – THE PROJECT
 • The project was highly successful. It achieved the technical objectives, demonstrating cutting 
techniques on a variety of ordnance, and greatly increased confidence in this technique within 
host-nation agencies.
 • The project was more complex than it might have appeared. It required the coordination of 
many agencies, the securing of several permissions and considerable logistical effort to prepare 
facilities and equipment. Overcoming these hurdles is a testament to the skill of all involved, but 
particularly of Sn Col Tuan, and Len Austin of Golden West.
 • Once all of the administrative and logistical challenges had been met, the project achieved high 
productivity within a short time frame. This demonstrates how much can be achieved by an MCS, 
once the preparatory effort has been made.
 • The project demonstrated, to all participants and observers, the value of cutting in order to 
visualise internal ammunition structures. Most of those present had never seen the internal 
components of live ammunition, and were fascinated by what they saw.
 • Although no training was provided in the formal exploitation process, the participants clearly 
grasped the value of cutting, for both the disposal and assessment of ammunition.
 • The project was conducted without incident or injury. However, there was the potential for 
accident and room for improvement with regards safety (see below).
SAFETY
During explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) oper-
ations, there is a tendency for inexperienced 
operators to fixate on explosive risks, while 
sometimes overlooking contextual hazards. In 
particular, the movement of heavy items (the 
Mk 82 and Mk 84 bombs) had the potential to 
cause serious injury. Within a risk matrix (scoring 
“likelihood” against “consequence”) this would 
probably have been assessed as a higher risk 
than that of an explosive event. 
Risk factors included lifting gear of unknown 
quality and strength, the presence of large 
numbers of people confined in small spaces, 
language differences and the natural enthusiasm 
of all participants to issue loud, conflicting 
suggestions and instructions simultaneously.
Operators regularly placed limbs, or their entire body, under heavy suspended weights, and placed hands 
and fingers into pinch points. Many had no personal protective equipment (PPE) such as gloves and 
helmets.
Unexploded and abandoned ordnance is handled routinely in Vietnam, and incidents involving the move-
ment of ammunition are extremely rare. However, the condition of the ordnance was unknown (which is 
what the exploitation process would aim to examine). Within a risk matrix, the potential “consequence” 
of multiple fatalities should lead to the “control” of using as few operators as possible during the 
movement of suspect ammunition. This is simply the application of the ALARP (as low as reasonably 
practicable) principle. 
While explosive risks were well-managed, people were 
sometimes in danger from mechanical injury 
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CONCLUSIONS – EXPLOITATION
 • The level of exploitation performed here was cursory. This was due to major limitations on 
time, ammunition types, facilities and equipment. No further disassembly or cutting could be 
performed, and no testing of mechanisms or energetic materials was possible.
 • Nevertheless, within the limitations outlined above, the work was successful. A number of 
different cut munitions were presented, examined and photographed.
 • The project demonstrated the feasibility of running exploitation in conjunction with a cutting 
programme, although even the most superficial examination cannot keep pace with the output of 
a well-run MCS.
 • Findings from exploitation were broadly in line with expectations and observations from 
previous work. They reinforce the conclusion that most types of ammunition present a lower 
risk of accidental detonation as they age, because the means of initiation tends to become 
non-functional, even though the explosive charge remains viable.
 • Many questions remain to be answered about the changing characteristics of ammunition 
components, their ability to function, and the possibility of new, alternative initiation mechanisms 
that might arise as a result of ageing.
RECOMMENDATIONS
The following actions are recommended:
1. Continued work. Further ordnance cutting and exploitation should continue to build on the 
foundation laid with this pilot programme. This work should:
a. Incorporate different ammunition types, such as grenades, rockets and submunitions.
b. Focus on initiation systems: 
- the condition and status of the intended fuzing system
- the possibility of new initiation mechanisms arising as a result of the ageing process.
c. Develop new protocols to optimise the productivity and cost-effectiveness of the work.
2. Safety. An enhanced safety programme should be integral to any further work, and should 
incorporate:
a. Training - to raise awareness of both explosive and non-explosive hazards; to explain risk 
assessment, risk treatment, the need for regular reviews and the principle of continual 
improvement.
b. PPE - the provision and systematic use of eye protection, gloves, helmets etc. 
3. Explosive analysis. As part of the effort to understand residual risk, further laboratory support 
is required for the analysis of explosives; particularly primary explosives. These will need to be 
transported, analysed and tested, which may require the development of new protocols. 
4. Mentoring. Expert advice, assistance and oversight should be made available to Vietnamese 




The M374 is a US 81 mm mortar bomb intended 
for use with smooth-bore mortars. The steel-
cased HE warhead accepts various fuzes, the 
most common being the M524 and M526 
point-detonation (PD) mechanical fuzes. 
Recovered mortars typically have the main 
charge and booster intact, with some or all of the 
external fuze assembly (the portion projecting 
beyond the steel warhead casing) missing or 
severely damaged during impact.
The tail assembly contains a primer and an 
ignition cartridge which, along with the external 
propellant charges, are expended during firing 
and will not be present on unexploded examples. 
The tail assemblies of these UXO mortar bombs, 
therefore, contained no hazardous energetic 
components. 
Each of the mortar bombs was cut perpendicular to the longitudinal axis. At least two cuts were made, to 
reveal the base of the fuze and the main explosive filling, but several mortar bombs were cut in multiple 
locations. 
During this pilot study there was no expectation of detailed fuze analysis, and besides, the size of the 
MCS bandsaw combined with the small diameter of the M374 mortar, made longitudinal cuts imprac-
tical. Nevertheless, some fuze cuts were made, allowing some opportunity for observations to be made.
The US M374 81 mm mortar bomb






The tail assembly is an important identification feature, but 
even among the small number examined, these ranged from 
near original to completely absent. In some cases, the alloy 
was severely corroded, altering the shape and appearance
Water entering the casing through the fuze well has caused 
corrosion of the inner assemblies, causing a build-up of 
expanded rust and aluminium oxide
Despite cracks and cosmetic changes to the explosive, the 
Composition B (RDX/TNT) filling in all M374 mortar bombs 
was otherwise unchanged. While stable, it is capable of 
detonation if subjected to extreme heat, shock or friction 
The appearance of these mortars can vary significantly, 
depending on damage and effects of ageing. There are still 
enough signatures for an experienced operator to make an 
identification, but these will continue to diminish
Cutting shows that rust on even the most heavily degraded 
steel casing is relatively superficial, and that the side wall 
remains extremely robust
Sample #1 shows virtually no degradation while the internal 
corrosion, caused by the ingress of water into sample #2, 





It is not unusual for the external portion of the fuze to be 
missing altogether. However, detonators may still remain 
within the section hidden by the casing
M524 fuze
M526 fuze
M524 fuze. The external portion of the fuze is normally 
damaged on impact, and may be missing altogether. The 
alloy fuze body is vulnerable to degradation
An M524 fuze, cut through the delay rotor and detonator. 
While many internal fuze structures remain intact, vulnerable 
components degrade to form expanded oxidation products 
(arrows); these often fill voids and seize mechanisms 
This M526 fuze was remarkably undamaged, with just 
the ballistic cap missing to expose the firing pin. Further 




Alloys can degrade rapidly under some conditions, with the 
expansion of oxidised material disguising the original shape, 
and complete loss of material in some instances 
This image illustrates the ability of the MCS to cut straight 




The M107 is a US 155 mm artillery projectile. 
The unitary steel-cased HE warhead is filled with 
Composition B and uses a booster pellet made 
from pressed TNT. Various nose fuzes can be 
fitted, but the most common is the M48 series 
of point-detonation mechanical fuzes. 
Recovered projectiles typically have the main 
charge and booster intact, with some or all of the 
external fuze assembly (the portion projecting 
beyond the steel warhead casing) missing or 
severely damaged during impact.
Engraving of the copper driving bands towards 
the rear of the casing gives a clear indication that the projectile has been fired. If the driving band remains 
smooth, then the projectile is unfired and the fuze (if fitted) is very unlikely to be armed. 
Two M107 155 mm projectiles were cut perpendicular to the longitudinal axis, with one cut being made 
near the base of the fuze (to reveal the booster) and another further back along the casing to view the 
main charge. 
A longitudinal cut was made through a fuze, mainly to demonstrate the technique, but also allowing an 
opportunity for observation.
The US M107 155 mm projectile
The engraved driving band on the left hand projectile (#8) clearly shows that it has been fired. The driving band on the right-hand 






The impact of projectile #7 has removed most of the fuze 
body
The surface of projectile #7 is heavily pitted. Nevertheless, a 
substantial proportion of the casing thickness remains
The pressed TNT boosters also remain in good condition
What appears to be a plug in the nose of projectile #8 is 
actually the remains of an M48A1 fuze
Cutting shows that the rust on the surface of projectile #8 is 
superficial and that the casing is in good condition
The main charge of the projectile shows no obvious signs of 
degradation. The pattern seen in the explosive is produced 
as the molten filling cools 
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M48A1 FUZE
M48 series fuzeA section through the fuze from projectile #8 shows 
that many of the internal components remain relatively 
undamaged. Further analysis would be needed to establish 
whether the fuze would be capable of functioning as a result 
of moderate impact, or other foreseeable action
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ANNEX C: OF 472 AND OF 482
DESCRIPTION
The OF 472 is a Russian 122 mm artillery projectile with a steel-cased HE warhead that is normally filled 
with TNT. The OF 482 is similar in design, but has a calibre of 130 mm. In Russian designation, the letters 
“OF” indicate that the projectile has a combined blast and fragmentation effect. Various point-detonation 
mechanical nose fuzes can be fitted. 
Two recovered (unexploded) OF 472 projectiles were examined, along with two unfired OF 482 project-
iles.






Markings, showing the designation and filling, are still just 
visible on the projectile surface that was lying uppermost. 
These would soon be lost with continued ageing
Impact has bent the casing of projectile #6, crushing the 
filling and allowing water to permeate throughout
The crushed and discoloured filling of projectile #6; it is not 
known whether this would affect its performance
As with the M107, the absence of the driving band on the 
right-hand projectile makes it harder to determine whether 
the projectile has been fired
Rusting has made little impression on the thick steel casing, 
although water may still enter via the fuze well
The main charge of cast TNT is slightly porous, and has 
allowed some water ingress over a prolonged period
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OTHER OBSERVATIONS
A section through the base of a 130 mm OF 482 projectile showing (left, from the outside moving inwards) the copper driving 
band, the thick steel casing of the base section and the lower extremity of the main charge, with embedded aluminium-based 
incendiary pellet
This section, once again, demonstrates the utility of cutting in order to visualise components, and their 
relationship to one another. For example, diagrams - or even X-rays - might not reveal that the incendiary 
pellet is often off-centre.
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ANNEX D: 160 MM F-853U MORTAR
DESCRIPTION
The F-853U is a Russian 160 mm mortar bomb with a distinctive tear-drop shaped body. The HE warhead 
is made from steel and normally filled with TNT. In Russian designation, the letter “F” indicates that the 
mortar bomb primarily has a blast effect, although the steel casing will inevitably produce fragmentation 
as well. 
The mortar bomb examined (allocated #12 during exploitation) was fitted with a point-detonating mechan-
ical nose fuze, which appeared to be in relatively good condition. The tail fin assembly was missing.
Diagram of the F-853U
The F-853U mortar bomb presented for cutting. The body shape is distinctive enough to allow for identification despite the 







Most of the fuze was present, but damage would almost 
certainly have permitted water to enter. The fuze was not 
cut, so no internal analysis could be made
The booster cup, which is also made from steel, showed 
remarkably little corrosion
There was no evidence of water ingress at this cut point, 
and no corrosion visible on the inside of the casing
Despite the presence of caked-on mud, the body of the 
mortar bomb was in relatively good condition. No markings 
were visible
The steel casing was in good condition and showed only 
superficial corrosion
The main charge (cast TNT) and the booster were in good 
condition
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ANNEX E: MK 80 SERIES BOMBS
DESCRIPTION
The US Mk 80 series are general-purpose low-drag aircraft bombs. They have steel casings designed to 
offer a good compromise between blast and fragmentation. There are four bombs in the series: Mk 81, 
Mk 82, Mk 83 and Mk 84, with nominal weights of: 250, 500, 1,000 and 2,000 lb (approximately 114, 
227, 454 and 909 kg) respectively. 
The bombs are modular, accepting a range of fuzes and tail units depending on the intended role. Tails 
include fixed conical units, folding fins from the “Snakeye” series, parachutes, and air-inflatable retarders 
(AIR) sometimes known as “ballutes”. The bombs have fuze wells in the nose and tail, and a charging well 
positioned on the top surface between the two suspension lugs. Two conduits run through the bomb, 
connecting the charging well to the nose and tail fuze wells. Suspension lugs on the Mk 81, 82 and 83 
are 356 mm (14 inches) apart, while those on the Mk 84 are 762 mm (30 inches) apart; most bombs also 
have a lifting lug well between the suspension lugs.
The bombs can accept a wide variety of fuzes, though most of those used in Vietnam were mechanical 
impact types. Some fuzes are specifically for use in either the nose or tail, while other fuzes can be used 
in either or both. For example, among the most common types, the M904 impact fuze is used in the 
nose, while the M905 impact fuze is used in the tail.
During the mission, cuts were made on two Mk 82 (500 lb) bombs and one Mk 84 (2,000 lb) bomb; each 
of these incorporated an M904 impact nose fuze, but no tail fuze. Due to limitations of time and equip-
ment, none of the fuzes were cut and only a superficial examination was made of each nose section.
 Section through the US Mk 82 GP bomb.  
All of the Mk 80 series bombs share a similar structure
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The appearance of typical nose-fuzed Mk 82 bombs before deployment
OBSERVATIONS
APPEARANCE
CASING AND MAIN FILLING
As expected, the explosive filling of the Mk 82 and Mk 84 
bombs remained in good condition, protected by the thick 
steel casing. The explosive is likely to remain viable as long 
as the casing remains intact
The Mk 84 bomb, along with two Mk 82 bombs, being delivered to the site. All of the bombs were fitted with an M904 nose 
fuze and no tail fuze. Tail assemblies were missing, as is often the case; these tend to become detached as the bomb enters the 
ground
Cutting the nose section, complete with fuze, of an Mk 82 
bomb. While most Mk 80 series bombs found in Vietnam 
will have a superficial layer of rust, the thick steel casing is 




ANNEX F: GOLDEN WEST REPORT
From 3-7 December 2018, Golden West Humanitarian Foundation (GWHF) personnel provided tech-
nical support for the management of residual ERW (MORE) programme sponsored by the GICHD. The 
planning of this operation was provided by the GICHD, Senior Colonel Tuan (retired), and Major Penh 
(VNMAC and former BOMICEN explosive ordnance disposal (EOD) technician) with the mobile cutting 
system (MCS) provided by BOMICEN (purchased through the US State Department WRA), along with 6 
BOMICEN EOD personnel (to operate the MCS and handle the munitions to be processed) and 6 Quang 
Tri province Provincial Military Command sappers (to set up the site, operate the 2 trucks, generators and 
provide security). Colin King, Fenix Technical Director, was there to exploit the cut munitions. A vehicle 
was provided by Golden West.
On Monday 3 December NPA range located in Quang Tri province near the coast was visited.
The site was established at the NPA range which had all the necessary safety distances. VNMAC, 
together with the local PMC, had created sandbag emplacements for the MCS, a safety bunker, along 
with other sandbagged emplacements for other activities and storage of munitions. The MCS was tested 
and found to be in fine working condition. The munitions scheduled for processing the day after were 
presented:
 • 2 x USSR OF 482 130 mm (filled with 3.6 kg of TNT) unfired projectiles
 • 2 x USSR OF 472 122 mm (filled with 3 kg of TNT) unfired projectiles
 • 2 x US M107 155 mm (filled with 6.62 kg of TNT) projectiles, both which had been fired, one was 
missing the nose fuze, while the other had a damaged M48 PD fuze
 • 8 x US M374 series 81 mm (filled with 1 kg of Composition B) mortars; the US M374 mortars 
included those with no fuze, 2 x M524 PD fuzes, 1 x M525 PD fuze, and 1 x M519 PD fuze
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The mobile cutting system was set up in a sandbagged bunker area with the hoist and generator. The Wi-Fi camera system was 
very unreliable so another camera system with hardwire and LCD screen will be bought, as a replacement. This will be presented 
to VNMAC (estimated cost is US$ 200).
View of the cutting area and overall drone view of the range. VNMAC, BOMICEN and PMC sappers did an excellent job of 
following safety distances and having the site set up prior to our arrival
The dirt road initially used was made serviceable due to the trucks going to and from the site during the set-up operation, whilst 
we walked 2 km to the site; another route, although a bit longer, was found for the following few days.
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View of the 8 x US M374 81 mm mortars prior to cutting
On Tuesday 4 December, we were able to process all of the 8 x 81 mm mortars, 2 x 155 mm projectiles, 
1 x 130 mm projectile, and the 1 x 122 mm projectile. We made 3 cuts each on the US M374 fuzes, as 
well as a cross-section cut on an M525 PD fuze, and a base cut of the USSR OF 482 130 mm showing 
the TCU located in the base of the projectile. Both of the US M107 155 mm projectiles were cut 3 times, 
exposing the booster cups and Composition B filler.
Before and after a cut of the M374 81 mm mortar
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Views of the cut of the US M525 PD fuze and the booster cup section of the M374 81 mm mortar; note the damage and 
expansion due to corrosion of the aluminum of the fuze
The base cut of the OF 482M 130 mm projectile showing the TCU incendiary plug embedded within the TNT filler. Also pictured 
is the M107 155 mm projectile with the cut at the booster cup and its HE filler
Drone view of the cutting of the M107 155 mm projectile; image on the right shows the result of the cut of the M48 series PD 
fuze that was on the fired M107 155 mm projectile
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On Wednesday 5 December, we received from the Quang Tri PMC, 2 x US Mk 82 500 lb bombs, 1 x 
USSR F-853U 160 mm mortar, and 2 x USSR OF 472 122 mm projectiles. We were able to cut all the 
items and conducted a burnout of the 2 x US Mk 82 500 lb bombs.
Cutting of the USSR F-853U 160 mm mortar with the GVMZ-7 PD fuze
Hoisting and setting in place the Mk 82 500 lb bomb for cutting; note the use of the bomb cradle to help support the bomb as 
well as keeping the hoist cables connected while cutting. Each of the Mk 82 500 lb bombs had a crushed M904 PD fuze and 
there was no tail fuze in either one. We cut between 20 cm and 25 cm so that the booster cup was not cut through and still 
allowed us to make the cut large enough for the burnout process
Hoisting the Mk 82 500 lb bomb onto the MCS, a single 1-ton hoist with chain was used
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Drone view of the cutting of the Mk 82 500 lb bomb; image on the right shows the cut nose section. The cut took 12 minutes
Removing the two pieces of the Mk 82 500 lb bomb after the cut
Burning out the main bodies of the 2 x Mk 82 500 lb bombs; the burnout lasted 22 minutes
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On Thursday 6 December, the PMC brought out the Mk 84 2,000 lb bomb which had an M904 series 
PD fuze but no tail fuze. A cut was successfully made, the nose fuze section was separated from the 
main body, and a burnout process on both the body and the nose fuze was achieved (and destroying the 
M904).
Prepping the Mk 84 2,000 lb bomb for cutting; note the use of 2 x 1-ton chain hoists and a table with sandbags to hold the bomb 
in place. It was important to make the bomb stable even when finished with the cut, so that it would not damage the cutter by 
moving or pinching the blade.
Front view of the cutting of the Mk 84. It was important to keep the bomb straight and as even as possible so as not to damage 
the cutter or the blade; image on the right shows the cutting blade with the metal lubricant evenly distributed throughout the 
length of the blade while cutting; the cut took 50 minutes due to the 22 mm thickness, and the slow drop and blade speed 
settings that we used for the cut.
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Wooden blocks were used to help hold the nose in place with the cutter clamps, as well as changing the angle of the clamps to 
help hold the nose steady; image on the right shows the body being slowly removed from the cutter after the successful cut
Drone and GoPro footage of the cut was taken
After the cut, the Mk 84 2,000 lb bomb was burned out along with the nose section containing the fuze; the Mk 84 bomb 
contains 429 kg of either Tritonal or H6 filler (this particular bomb contained Tritonal) and it took 40 minutes to burn out; the nose 
fuze detonated as required during the burnout. The image on the right shows the intense heat on the inside of the bomb casing 
even after the burn; note the bomb section that was cut off, containing the M904 nose fuze which was destroyed during the 
burnout process, to the right of the body.
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Conclusion: we successfully cut and burned out all of the following items:
 • 8 x US M374 81 mm mortars
 • 2 x US M107 155 mm projectiles
 • 2 x USSR OF 472 122 mm projectiles
 • 2 x USSR OF 482 130 mm projectiles
 • 1 x USSR F-853U 160 mm mortar
 • 2 x US Mk 82 500 lb bombs
 • 1 x US Mk 84 2,000 lb bomb
All of these items were destroyed using the cut and burnout process and did not require any demolition 
operations, which are a cause of concern for local residents due to the extreme noise and danger of 
fragments from detonations. The resulting burned out casings can also be used as training aids when 
welded together. The MCS is an economical and safe process to destroy munitions.
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ANNEX G: ASSESSING QUALITY OF 
EXPLOSION SAMPLES FROM UXO
SAMPLES AND CHARACTERISTICS 
NO NAME OF SAMPLE SYMBOL AMOUNT CHARACTERISTICS
1 TNT explosive from 155mm projectile Ph155 1 Dark yellow
2 TNT explosive from 155mm projectile Ph155 pitted 01 Dark yellow, with many small holes
3 TNT explosive from 160mm motar Co 160 01 Light yellow
4 Comp H6 explosives from bomb MK-82 Comp-H6 01 Gray
5 Tetryl explosive from the 155mm exploition station fuse Tetryl Ph155 01 Yellow
6 Tetryl explosives from the mortar explosion station fuse 160mm Tetryl Co 160 01 Yellow
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METHOD AND TESTING EQUIPMENT
Conduct experiments to determine the quality criteria of explosives according to standardized methods, 
specifically:
 • Determination of moisture content, insoluble matter in acetone, RDX, TNT, Wax, oil rust by 
analytical methods.
 • Determination of melting temperature on SP-10 and DSC Diamond devices (Figure 1), sample 
volume of about 20 mg, measuring accuracy to 0.1oC.
Figure 2. Flammable (burning) temperature determination device DT-400 (Germany).
 • Determination of the burning temperature on DT-400 device (Figure 2), capable of heating to 
400oC with accuracy of 0.10oC. Install SP1 temperature (start measurement) and SP2 (end of 
measurement) so that the explosive temperature of the explosion is between SP1 and SP2 and 
higher than SP1 by about 250oC, heating speed of 5oC / min. The weight of each sample is about 
0,15 g, the sample is contained in a heat-resistant glass test tube.
Figure 1. Differential calorimeter scanning device DSC 
Diamond (USA).
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Figure 4. Sample explosion, lead cylinder compression 
measurement.
 • Determination of vacuum heat resistance on the Stabil Vacuum tester (Figure 3) at 100oC 
continuously for 48 hours, the sample volume per test is about 2gr
Figure 3. Vacuum stability tester (Czech) 
determines chemical stability under vacuum 
thermal stabilization method:
- Picture above: control unit of heating mode 
and computer;
- Picture below: heating block and test tubes 
containing sample + pressure sensor.
 • Measurement of lead cylinder compression by standard lead tools and cylinders (Figure 4), 
explosive dose is made in cylindrical ingot shape with diameter of 40 mm with density of 
1.0 g/cm3, compressed in paper tube create detonator holes, the volume of each explosive dose 
of 50g, use the No. 8 electric detonator to detonate.
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Figure 5. Determination of the ability to explosion energy with the articulation pendulum.
 • Determination of the ability to explosion energy by the articulation pendulum (Figure 5), the 
explosive dose is produced in the form of cylindrical ingot 30 mm in diameter with a density of  
1.0 g/cm3, compressed in the paper tube to create a hole of a checker. The mass of each explosive 
dose is 10 g, detonating the explosive dose with electric detonator No. 8.
 • Determination of impact sensitivity on Cast hammer (Figure 6) under standard conditions (mass 
of 10 kg hammer, 25 cm drop height), sample weight per test of 0.05 g; Each sample carried out 
25 experiments. 
 
After dropping the hammer, the sample is considered to explode when one of the following 
phenomena occurs: sound, flame, smoke, pattern discolouration.




1. TNT EXPLOSIVE SAMPLES FROM THE 155MM ARTILLERY SHELL 
(TNT PH155), TNT FROM THE 155MM ARTILLERY SHELL (TNT 
PH155 PITTED) AND TNT FROM 160MM MORTAR (TNT CO160)
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Comment:
1. Melting temperature: The melting temperature of 03 TNT samples is lower than that of TNT 
level 1 (according to TCVN / QS 596: 2018) and the standard MIL-DTL-248D, proving that all TNT 
samples have been degraded.
2. Content of insoluble substance in acetone: The content of acetone insoluble substance of TNT 
samples meets the requirements of TCVN / QS 596: 2018, but does not meet the requirements of 
MIL-DTL-248D (lying value between MIL-DTL-248D and TCVN / QS 596: 2018).
3. Oil leakage: Oil leakage of 03 TNT samples is satisfactory for level 1 TNT according to TCVN / QS 
596: 2018.
4. Burning temperature: The flaming temperature of the pitting TNT sample taken from the 155 mm 
(288.8 °C) artillery shell is much lower than the TNT sample taken from the 155 mm artillery shell 
(297.3 °C) and TNT taken from a 160 mm mortar (300.8 °C). This is a demonstration of the impact 
of environmental conditions on the quality of explosives in bombs and projectiles.
5. Vacuum heat resistance: Vacuum heat resistance of all 03 TNT samples is much higher than the 
standard MIL-DTL-248D stipulating safe storage of explosives (less than 2.0 cm3/g ), proving that 
the above TNT explosive samples have high thermal stability, still very good quality, capable of 
safe storage.
6/7. Lead block (Trauzl) test and pendulum test: Results from both of these tests, for all three 
TNT samples, meet the requirements of TCVN / QS 596: 2018. This confirms that the energy 
and destructive power of these samples are the same as for newly-produced TNT, reflecting the 
quality and characteristics of the explosive.  The differences in the pendulum test results are partly 
due to the inherent errors involved with this method.
8. Impact sensitivity: The impact sensitivity of two samples TNT taken from 155mm artillery shell 
does not meet the requirements of TCVN / QS 596: 2018, which partly reflects the trend of 
increasing risk of unsafe explosion when subject to impact impulse. With the sample TNT taken 
from the 160mm mortar warhead, the impact sensitivity is satisfactory according to TCVN / QS 
596: 2018, but this value is in the upper limit compared to the requirement.
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2. TETRYL EXPLOSIVE SAMPLES FROM THE 155MM ARTILLERY 
EXPLOSION STATION (TETRYL PH155) AND FROM THE 
160MM MORTAR EXPLOSION STATION (TETRYL CO160)
NO CRITERIA TETRYL CO160 TETRYL PH155 TCQS -VN MIL-T-339C
1 Melting temperature, °C 128.5 129.0 128.8 ÷ 129.5 128.8 ÷ 129.5
2 Content insoluble in acetone,% 0.07 0.09 - ≤ 0.1




at 100 °C and 48 
h, cm3/g










123 - - -
7 Impact sensitivity,% 52 48 50 ÷ 60 -
Comment:
1. Melting temperature: The melting temperature of Tetryl samples taken from the mortar explosion 
station 160mm does not meet the requirements of MIL-T-339C (US), which proves that the 
quality of Tetryl samples has been reduced. The melting temperature of the Tetryl sample comes 
from the 155mm artillery blast station that meets US standards.
2. The insoluble substance in acetone: The insoluble substance content of acetone of Tetryl 
samples meets the requirements of MIL-T-339C.
3. Burning temperature: The burning temperature of the Tetryl sample from the mortar explosion 
station is 160 mm (181.7 ° C) lower than that of the Tetryl model from the 155mm gun firing 
station (184.3 ° C), this proofs that the heat stability of Tetryl was higher from the 155 mm shell 
bullet station.
4. Vacuum heat resistance: Vacuum heat resistance of both 02 Tetryl samples is much higher than 
TCQS and standard MIL-DTL-248D (less than 2.0 cm3/g), proving Tetryl samples All have high 
thermal stability, still very good quality, capable of safe storage.
5/6. Compaction of lead pillars and potential explosive energy: These characteristics reach the 
equivalent value according to the tests for newly produced Tetryl.
7. Impact sensitivity: The impact sensitivity of both Tetryl samples meet the Vietnamese standards.
AGEING STUDY56
3. COMP-H6 EXPLOSIVE SAMPLE IN MK 82 BOMB
NO CRITERIA RESULTS OF TEST MIL-E-22267A
1 Content RDX, % - 45.1 ± 3.0
2 Content TNT, % 31.4 29.2 ± 3.0
3 Content Al, % 19.7 21.0 ± 3.0
4 Content Wax, % - 4.7 ± 1.0
5 Moisture content, % 0.4 ≤ 0.2
7 Burning temperature, °C 207.8 -
8 Vacuum heat resistance (VTS) at  100 °C and 48 h, cm3/g 0.507 ≤ 2.00
9 Lead cylinder compression, mm 21.3 -
10 Ability to exploition energy ,% TNT 137.2 -
11 Impact sensitivity, % 36 -
Comment:
1-4. Composition criteria: Comp-H6 sample component still meets the requirements of MIL-E-
22267A (USA).
5. Moisture content: unsatisfactory moisture content criteria according to standard MIL-E-22267A. 
This may be due to the influence of environmental conditions.
7. Burning temperature: equivalent in value to published research materials.
8. Vacuum thermal stability: Vacuum thermal stability of Comp-H6 explosives meets the 
standards.
9/10. Compaction of lead pillars and potential explosive energy: equivalent value compared with 
published research documents.
11. Impact sensitivity: The impact sensitivity of Comp-H6 explosive is relatively high. This is the point 
to note when there are mechanical impacts on this explosive.
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GENERAL EVALUATION REVIEW OF THE LAB
 • Explosive samples have appeared unsatisfactory compared with Vietnamese standards and US 
military standards.
 • The strength of explosive samples still meets the requirements compared with the new 
explosives produced. Demonstrate that the destructive power of these explosive samples is still 
nearly as strong as the new compositions.
 • The impact sensitivity of some explosive samples tends to be slightly higher than required. This 
needs to be taken into account in the course of working with bombs and mines left behind in the 
war.
RECOMMENDATIONS AND HINTS
The indicators identified above are not sufficient to predict the trend of changing the quality of the 
samples contained in bombs, bullets left after the war. Therefore, additional analyzes and aging studies 
are needed in order to have more comprehensive information and can predict the duration of explosives 
to ensure safety during storage.
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